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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case follows an Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("IAPA") complaint filed by
Kirby Vickers ("Kirby") with the Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine ("Board") against Dr. Kelly
Collins, DVM ("Dr. Collins"), for negligent care of animals, lack of care of animals and violations
of the Principles of Veterinary Ethics. The Board conducted no hearing; instead, the Liaison
Officer of the Board sent Kirby a letter dated August 25, 2018 (the "Letter") finding the allegations
unfounded and declaring the complaint closed. R. Vol. 1, p 20.
The gist of this appeal is whether only licensing and disciplinary boards may file an IAPA
contested case before themselves; or, instead, may injured members of the public file a contested
case before licensing and disciplinary boards.
Kirby appealed to the district court on September 20, 2018 (R. Vol. 1, p 6), and filed a First

Amended Complaint on October 10, 2018 to include the members of the Board. R. Vol. 1, p. 13.
On or around November 16, 2018, the Board filed an I.R.Civ P. Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss
the case for failure to state a cause of action. R. Vol. 1, p. 21. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
was heard before the court on January 31, 2019. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 5. The district court issued its

Memorandum Decision on July 1, 2019, (R. Vol. 1, p. 73), and entered Judgment on July 1, 2019,
dismissing the First Amended Complaint in its entirety against each defendant with prejudice. R.
Vol. 1, p 83.
Kirby filed a Notice ofAppeal on August 8, 2019. R. Vol. 1, p. 85.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts come from Exhibit 1 to the First Amended Complaint filed as the
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appeal in the district court. R. Vol. 1, p. 17-19. Exhibit I to the First Amended Complaint is the
IAPA administrative complaint before the Board.
On December 12, 2017, Kirby took his adult cat, Chaim, to veterinarian Dr. Collins at
Canyon Veterinary Clinic for a condition above the eye of the cat. Id. at p. 18. Before this
appointment, Kirby had provided Dr. Collins with Chaim's medical record from Kindness
Veterinary Clinic in which Kindness Veterinary Clinic had diagnosed that condition above
Chaim's eye as Eosinophilic Granuloma Complex ("EGC"). Id. Dr. Collins admitted she did not
read these records but instead unnecessarily performed a second biopsy on Chaim to diagnose the
same condition and issued the diagnosis ofEGC, again, at Kirby's expense and Chaim's jeopardy
of further harm from a second invasive procedure. Id.
Subsequently, Kirby made an appointment with Dr. Collins for February 1, 2018, to
perform surgeries and inoculations on Kirby's four (4) kittens. Id. at. p. 17.
Two days before the appointment, at 5:30 in the evening, Kirby contacted Canyon
Veterinary Clinic with concern about one of his kittens that had become very sick, perhaps fatally.

Id. Canyon instructed Kirby to take his kitten to West Vet in Boise. Id. Kirby explained that the
condition of the kitten made this trip to West Vet too far and that he declined to utilize West Vet
because of their previous negligent care to one of his kittens, which resulted in the death of the
kitten. Id. The person on the phone then advised Kirby that Dr. Collins would not provide care
that day and had no suggestions for alternate care. Id. Kirby asked that Dr. Collins to give him a
call and advised that he would be filing a complaint with the Veterinary Board. Id.
Dr. Collins did not return Kirby's call until the afternoon of the following day, January 30,
2018. Id. Dr. Collins told Kirby that she would not see his sick kitten, canceled the February 1,
2018 appointment, and terminated the veterinarian-client relationship. Id. Dr. Collins said her
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actions were in retribution for Kirby informing her that he would be filing a complaint about her
behavior. Id. Further, she declined to provide a referral to another vet. Id.
Subsequently, on March 5, 2018, Kirby did file a complaint with the Idaho Board of
Veterinary Medicine, referring to his rights to do so under the rules promulgated pursuant to the
IAPA. Id. p. 17-19.
The complaint recited the above behavior, the seemingly universal referral to West Vet,
which in many instances were impractical or unreasonable for patients and their owners, cited both
professional negligence and various ethical principles from the Principles of Veterinary Medical
Ethics of the American Veterinary Medical Association that Dr. Collins had violated. Attachment
1. The Board has adopted Principles ofVeterinary Medical Ethics by incorporation in the Board's
rules to govern the behavior ofldaho's veterinarians. IDAPA 46.01.01.005.0l(a).
The ethical transgressions occasioned by Dr. Collins behavior, then challenged and alleged
by the First Amended Complaint and prohibited by the Principles of Veterinary Medical Ethics of
the American Veterinary Medical Association, are summarized:
Item Ilb: In the veterinarian-client-patient relationship, a veterinarian may not abandon a
patient with a condition without a referral and adequate provision of treatment during the
transition.
Item IIIBh: Negligent referral.
Item VIia: Veterinarians must adhere to their client agreement and render non-negligent
care.
Item VIIb: Veterinarians must render care in an emergency.
Item VIie: When a veterinarian is unable to render services in an emergency, they must
provide emergency advice and information consistent with the needs of locality.
R. Vol. 1, p. 13-16.
The Board did not conduct a hearing on Kirby's complaint. Id. The record shows the only
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activity taken upon Kirby's complaint, which the Board may or may not have authorized, is limited
to the Letter from the Board's Liaison Officer reciting a complaint concerning a "kitten", instead
of a cat and the several kittens as actually alleged in the First Amended Complaint, announcing no
violations of the Veterinary Practices Act, and the closing Complaint No. BVM 19-04. Id. That
was all. Although the Letter was an agency action of particular applicability that determined the
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, and other legal interests of both Kirby and Dr. Collins,
neither the Board nor its' staff provided a record, an explanation, any reasoning, or, more
importantly, a hearing as required by the IAPA and IDAPA to adjudicate the complaint Kirby
filed. Kirby timely filed an appeal with the district court seeking an adjudication of his right to a
hearing.

III.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Kirby filed an appeal from the actions of the Board as a Complaint before the district court
on September 20, 2018 and filed a First Amended Complaint on October 10, 2018. The Board
filed a Rule 12, I.R.Civ. P. Motion to Dismiss on November 16, 2018. The district court heard the

Motion on January 31, 2019. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision on July 1, 2019,
to dismiss with prejudice. On August 8, 2019 the Kirby filed a Notice ofAppeal with the district
court.

IV.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the findings in this matter by the Board, the Letter declining to hold a hearing or
otherwise act pursuant to the IAPA upon the complaint Kirby filed, but instead summarily
closing Complaint BVM 19-04, was final agency action giving rise to a right to appeal
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because the agency took action amounting to an order by determining the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of Kirby and Dr. Collins, or,
alternatively, the Letter ending the case gave right to an appeal because the Board failed to
issue an order.
2. Whether the violation of the standard of care owed to a client by a regulated professional
person allows an aggrieved client to file a contested case against a regulated professional;
or, instead, as found by the lower court, only the state regulatory board may file, or decline
to file, a contested case in its unfettered discretion without a record and without disclosure
of any activity dismissing the aggrieved client's contested case notwithstanding IAPA's
requirement that a hearing, with a record and specific findings, follow the filing of a
complaint in a contested case.
3. Whether the violation of the standard of care owed to a client by a state-regulated
professional person, in this case, a veterinarian, aggrieves the client or, instead, as found
by the lower court, aggrieves only the state regulatory agency, in this case, the Board.
4. Kirby seeks attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(a)(5),
40, and 41(a) and Idaho Code§ 12-117 based upon the black letter law in Laughy v. Idaho

Trans. Dept. 139 Idaho 107 (2003) establishing that the proceedings below were a
contested case and final agency action.

v.
STANDARD ON REVIEW
Idaho Code § 67-5279(2) provides the scope of judicial review of agency action:
(2) When the agency was not required by the provisions of this chapter or by
other provisions of law to base its action exclusively on a record, the court shall
affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the action was:
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
The Standard of Review of the legal issues stated in this Brief applied by District and
Appellate courts in Idaho in reviewing agency decisions is reviewed de novo regarding whether
the law was correctly applied. Idaho Cnty v. Idaho Dep't of Health and Welfare, 128 Idaho 846,
848, 920 P.2d 62, 64, (1996).
VI.
ARGUMENT
A. Introduction

The district court's IAPA analysis significantly deviates from the statutory scheme. To
explain the court's unorthodoxy, this Brief will first catalog the statutory standards of the IAPA
concerning contested cases, and then this Brief will explain how the district court strayed from the
statutory requirements of the IAPA concerning contested cases.
B. Normative operation of the statutes and rules concerning contested cases under the

IAPA.
The Idaho Legislature adopted the IAPA, Title 67 Chapter 52, in 1965. As is relevant here,
the IAPA codified how the Legislature directed Idaho agencies to conduct adjudicatory functions
which determined citizens' rights and responsibilities by defining those processes with specificity.
Overall, the Legislature labeled the process of adjudicating rights before an agency as a "contested
case."

If an administrative agency did not adopt its own procedural rules for the guidance of the
conduct of a contested case, the Attorney General's procedural rules apply. Idaho Code § 67APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 6

5206(5). Those rules are found at IDAPA 04.11.04. The Idaho Board of Veterinary Medicine
expressly acknowledged the adoption of these procedural rules at IDAPA 46.01 .01.003 concerning
the governance of contested cases.
The contested case is a proceeding by an agency that may result in the issuance of an order
and is governed by the provisions of the IAPA. Idaho Code§ 62-5204. An order is defined in the
IAPA as meaning an agency action of particular applicability that determines the legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one ( 1) or more specific persons. Idaho
Code§ 62-5201(1).
The filing of a complaint initiates a contested case. Langley v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp. 149
Idaho 867, 873 (2010), citing IDAPA 04.11.01.210.
Agency action means an order, or the failure to issue an order, or an agency performance
of, or failure to perform any duty placed on it by law. Idaho Code§ 67-5201(3).
Whether disposition of a contested case is informal (Idaho Code § 67-5241) or results in a
formal order (Idaho Code§ 67-5246), or the failure to issue an order, the disposition is final agency
action. Idaho Code§ 67-5246.
In a contested case, all parties shall receive notice of a hearing to generate an order. Idaho
Code § 67-5242.

An agency order must be in writing and shall include a detailed statement containing the
underlying facts of records supporting the decision, and a statement of available procedures and
applicable time limits for seeking reconsideration or other administrative relief. Idaho Code § 675248.
A party has a right of review of any final agency action. Idaho Code§ 67-5270. This
means whether there was an order, a failure to issue an order, or failure to follow an administrative
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duty, a party has a right to appeal.
In this case, the district court acknowledges, and the Board does not contest that the Letter
contains all the requirements for a complaint. R. Vol. 1. p. 77. Once Kirby filed his complaint,
under the foregoing rules, the complaint initiated a contested case. The Letter to Kirby was,
therefore, final agency action when it closed Complaint number BMV 19-04. As further noted
above final agency action is reviewable (Idaho Code § 67-5270).
C. The district court's deviation from the IAPA paradigm governing the conduct of
contested cases.

The district court commenced its analysis, examining the Letter, which was written at the
end phase of the contested case process. The district court sought to determine whether the Letter,
as the last action of the Board, entitled Kirby to judicial review. The district court noted the IAPA
entitled Kirby to judicial review if there was an order (Idaho Code §67-5270(3)) and if there was
final agency action (Idaho Code §67-5270(2)). The district court found the Board Letter met
neither requirement and thus the IAPA allowed for no appeal.
The core of the district court's "no order" analysis begins with the conclusion that no
contested case ever existed. To reach this conclusion, the district court noted, first, a contested
case is a proceeding that may result in an order, but the Letter was not an order; therefore there
was no contested case. The district court relied upon the analysis in Westway Constructions UNST.

Inc. vs. Idaho Trans. Dep 't, 139 Idaho 107 (2003) to decide whether the letter was an order.
Westway provides two criteria to determine what is an order. Id. at 112. First, did the
Board have jurisdiction over the matter before it; and secondly, did the agency determine the legal
right, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more persons. Id.
The district court correctly concluded the Board has jurisdiction of the complaint.
The district court, however, reasoned that the Letter did not determine any legal rights,
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 8

duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more persons because no contested
case preceded it.
In support of this tautology, the district court relies in part on Idaho Code § 67-5241, which
allows for the informal disposition of contested cases. Idaho Code§ 67-5241 is permissive. The
statute allows the Board to decline to initiate a contested case; and, it allows for informal
disposition if there is a contested case, but nowhere does the statue say it eradicates the entirety of
the remainder of the IAPA if the Board declines to prosecute. In fact, the procedural rules the
Board expressly adopted contradict the interpretation that the possibility of an informal disposition
allows the Board to make that decision on its own. IDAPA 04.11.01.101 provides:
Informal procedure may include individual contacts by or with the agency staff
asking for information, advice or assistance from the agency staff, or proposing
informal resolution of formal disputes under the law administered by the agency.
IDAPA 04.l 1.01.103 adds:

Unless parties agree to the contrary in writing, informal proceedings do not
substitute for formal proceedings and do not exhaust administrative remedies, and
informal proceeding [sic] are conducted without prejudice to the right of the parties
to present the matter formally to the agency.
[Emphasis added.]
Thus, the Board's own rules undermine and contradict the district court's reliance upon
the existence of the possibility of informal proceedings as authorizing the usual due process
requirements of a contested case, absent the agreement of the parties.
More to the point however, Laughy v. Idaho Trans. Dept. 139 Idaho 107 (2003) makes
clear the even if the matter before the Board were informally resolved, it is nonetheless a
contested case.
The Dissent asserts that only formally adjudicated cases are contested cases under
the IAPA. To the contrary, no statute or rule makes formal proceedings a
prerequisite to a contested case. A contested case is defined both by statue and by
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 9

the Rules as a "proceeding by an agency ... that may result in the issuance of an
order."
Laughy, 145 Idaho at 872.
Further, nothing in IAPA empowers the Liaison Officer to adjudicate cases. Idaho Code §
54-2105(6) authorizes the Liaison Officer to "review and mediate" complaints, but not decide
complaints. All other deficiencies of the activities of the Board aside, the person who putatively
decided the fate of Kirby and his animals simply had no authority to do so.
Second, the Memorandum Decision relies upon the power of the Board to initiate and
prosecute contested cases as definitive of its exclusive power to initiate a contested case. The
district court opined "The Board has the power to '[i]nitiate and conduct disciplinary hearings or
proceedings,' but it is not required to do so." R. Vol 1. p. 77. In Laughy, the Idaho Court declined
acceptance of this exclusivity argument which posits that only the agency may initiate a contested
case. Justice Jones, in his dissent concurring in the result, expressly said, and the Majority
expressly rejected, that the power of an agency to decline to initiate a contested case means others
cannot. Justice Jones wrote in his dissent:
ITD apparently has a policy of declining to initiate contested cases in the context
of permit applications. Rather, it appears that ITD generally treats these matters in
an informal manner, comparable in some respects to the informal procedure
described in AG Rule 100, "i.e., procedures without a record to be preserved for
later agency or judicial review, without the necessity of representation according to
Rule 202, without formal designation of parties, without the necessity of hearing
examiners or other presiding officers, or without other formal procedures required
by these rules for formal proceedings." IDAPA 04.11.01.100.
Since the Department did not consider this to be a contested case and did not
process it as a contested case but, rather, processed it informally, it is simply not a
contested case. The Legislature gives an agency the option to decline to initiate a
contested case and that is what occurred here. Therefore, the Respondents are
entitled to review under Idaho Code section 67-5270(2) which provides, "A person
aggrieved by final agency action other than an order in a contested case is entitled
to judicial review under this chapter if the person complies with the requirements
of sections 67-5271 through 67-5279, Idaho Code." While the permit and
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page I 0

application documents, or the Memorandum of Decision, may be orders, they are
not orders in a contested case because this was not a contested case. One need not
be a "party" in order to obtain judicial review of a final agency action where the
action is something "other than an order in a contested case" under the APA. An
aggrieved person may seek judicial review of final agency action resulting outside
the context of a contested case. As persons who live along the route and who will
be affected by the transportation of the ConocoPhillips units, Respondents certainly
appear to be aggrieved persons. As such, they have a right to be heard.
Laughy, 149 Idaho at 879.
The Majority directly answered the contention that having a prosecutorial function
prohibits the public from filing a complaint and debunked the notion of exclusivity, i.e., that only
if an agency initiates a contested case might a contested case resulting in an order result:
The Dissent nonetheless contends that there was no contested case because the ITD
stated that it declined to initiate one and indicated that it did not regard
ConocoPhillips' s application for a permit as a contested case. The Dissent cites I.C.
§ 67-5241(1)(a), which does provide that "an agency or a presiding officer may
decline to initiate a contested case." Again, however, it does not matter whether the
agency regards a proceeding to be part of a contested case or not. Proceedings that
result in the issuance of an order are contested cases. LC. § 67-5240.
Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a) does not state that an agency may decline to follow the
required statutory procedures in a contested case. It states that an agency may decline
to initiate a contested case. It recognizes that some agencies have a prosecutorial
function and, when exercising that function, have discretion to decline to prosecute.
Agencies can have both prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions. As IDAPA
04.11.01.420 states, "[w]hen statute assigns to an agency both (1) the authority to
initiate complaints or to investigate complaints made by the public, and (2) the
authority to decide the merits of complaints, the agency is required to perform two
distinct functions: prosecutorial/investigative and adjudicatory." The prosecutorial
function includes deciding whether or not to issue a complaint. As IDAP A
44.11.01.420.01 states, "[t]he prosecutorial function includes presentation of
allegations or evidence to the agency head for determination whether a complaint
will be issued .... " A "complaint" charges a person with a violation of the law. "All
pleadings charging other person(s) with acts or omissions under law administered
by the agency are called 'complaints."' IDAPA 04.11.01.240.01. The filing of a
complaint initiates a contested case. See IDAP A 04.11.01.210 ("Pleadings in
contested cases are called applications or claims or appeals, petitions, complaints,
protests, motions, answers, and consent agreements."). Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(a)
simply provides that an agency has discretion to decline to prosecute-to decline to
initiate a contested case.
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Laughy, 149 Idaho at 872-873.
Two statements from the above quote articulate the black letter law dispositive of this
case:
Idaho Code§ 67-5241(l)(a) does not state that an agency may decline to follow the
required statutory procedures in a contested case. It states that an agency may
decline to initiate a contested case.
And.

The filing of a complaint initiates a contested case. See IDAPA 04.11.01.210
("Pleadings in contested cases are called applications or claims or appeals,
petitions, complaints, protests, motions, answers, and consent agreements."). Idaho
Code§ 67-5241(l)(a) simply provides that an agency has discretion to decline to
prosecute-to decline to initiate a contested case.

Id.
Thus, although the Memorandum Decision recites the agency's prosecutorial discretion
found in Idaho Code §67-524l(l)(a) to prove the exclusivity of agency-initiated proceedings as
the only proceedings which become contested cases, Idaho case law since 2003 has made is
abundantly clear that all Idaho Code §67-524l(l)(a) provides is that an agency may decline to
initiate a contested case. The statute does not say that the only way to initiate a contested case is
by the Board filing a contested case.
Not unexpectedly, because the Board allowed no hearing, no advocacy, no evidence, no
explanation, and no light at all upon the subject at hand, the final agency action in this instance
suffered from two glaring deficiencies. First, the Board failed to create any discernable record by
which to review its behavior. Secondly, The Letter, if the same was an order, did not contain the
required contents as set forth in Idaho Code § 67-5248, more specifically, the Letter lacked
findings of fact based on any record. The Board's failure to provide or disclose any basis of
decision whatsoever in its final agency action constitutes a major concern for any person in Kirby's
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circumstance.
The district court reached its conclusion that the Board behaved in accordance with the
IAPA by reasoning that because the Board has a prosecutorial function, and the Board could
decline to initiate a complaint and therefore (a non sequitur) any compliant filed by a person other
than the Boarq is essentially a nullity, and thus did not initiate a contested case. Without a
contested case, there could be no order.
Whether the Board has a prosecutorial function, and whether the Board may choose not to
issue its own complaint, woefully fails to define either when a complaint initiates a contested case
or when the Board determines the rights and responsibilities of one or more persons resulting in
an order. The Letter clearly, by its terms, determined rights and responsibilities, reciting "I did not
find violations of the Veterinary Practices Act by Dr. Collins." R. Vol. 1, p. 20. The entirety of
the Court's opinion in this regard depends almost solely on two conclusory statements made
without the citation of any relevant authority. "Thus, only an official complaint will initiate a
contested case" and "[h]owever, the final responsibility for enforcement of the provisions of the
laws and regulations relating to veterinarians is vested in the Board, not a member of the public
who has filed a complaint against a veterinarian." R. Vol. 1. p. 77.
Kirby filed a complaint, the Letter determined rights and responsibilities, and the Board
issued a final order, although a defective one because it did not contain its reasonings required by
Idaho Code § 67-5248.
The next flaw in the district court's opinion is that even if the letter was not an order, it was
final agency action, which is defined as the failure to issue an order. Idaho Code§ 67-5201(3)(b).
All final agency actions, whether or not resulting in an order, enjoy a right of review under Idaho
Code§ 67-5270. Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Laughy agree final agency action,
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with or without an order, is appealable.
The finding that nothing happens unless the Board files a complaint, and therefore no order
can issue, dooms the district court's reasoning to logical fatality. The conclusion that only the
Board can bring a contested case relies on an analysis that there is no order, which in turn relies
upon the premise that only the Board can bring a contested case and because there is no contested
case, there is no order. The choice before this Court devolves into accepting this torturous circular
tautology or following the simple, linear statutory route paved by the legislature. 1
The district court's illogical process appears to be an effort to construct some scheme of
agency common law inside the spacing between the IAP A statutes by interposing a novel
requirement that only the Board may bring a complaint, essentially amending and contradicting
the IAPA. As this Court held in Laughy, the statutory body of the IAPA concerning contested
cases is too tightly jointed to allow for such intermeddling and agencies must take the law as the
legislature presented it. There exists no room for an agency to create its own "policy" regarding
what it desires to hear and what it will not. This policy, specifically described in Justice Jones
dissent in Laughy, was expressly rejected in the holding of the majority that "The filing of a
complaint initiates a contested case."
D. Whether Kirby is Aggrieved by the Board's Decision

i.

INTRODUCTION
The district court correctly required that a right of review accrues only to a party

1

Some disciplinary and oversight boards have statutorily been given the power of preliminary review this Board
seeks to usurp through the development of an agency common law. For instance, if a citizen files a complaint in
front of the Idaho Board of Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors, the board reviews to determine
if the filing is unfounded or de minim us. Absent that finding, however, the board does its duty under the IAPA and
conducts a disciplinary hearing. Idaho Code §54-1220(2). Clearly the legislature knows how to provide a screening
process; but, even in the instance when it has done so, citizens retain the right to have their valid complaints heard.
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"aggrieved" by final agency action.

Idaho Code § 67-5270.

The district court incorrectly

concluded, however, that the processes leading to the Letter, or more accurately the absence of
processes leading to the Letter, and content of the Letter itself, aggrieved Kirby.
The district court correctly states the general Idaho black letter law standard to judge
whether a party is aggrieved:
"Broadly speaking, a party or person is aggrieved by a decision when, and only
when, it operates directly and injuriously upon his personal, pecuniary, or property
rights. Ashton v. Ashton Mem 'I. Inc., 155 Idaho 309,311,311 P.3d 730, 732 (2013)
(quoting Application of Fernan Lake Vil/., 80 Idaho 412,415, 331, P.2d 278, 279
(1958)). "This Court has more succinctly stated the test as to whether a party is
aggrieved as follows: 'Would the party have the thing if the erroneous judgment
had not been entered? if the answer be yea, he is a party aggrieved."' Id, quoting
State v. Eves, 6 Idaho 144, 148, 53 P. 543, 544 (1898).
R. Vol. 1, p. 79.
The district court found the activities of the Board, and the Letter, did not aggrieve Kirby
because he did not lose money or a tangible thing. Further, the district court determined that
because Kirby had no right to file a complaint in the first instance, which as explained above the
district court perceived to be a decision resting solely in the discretion of the Board, Kirby lost
nothing he had a right to expect. As discussed above, the finding that only the Board could file a
complaint simply does not comport with the IAP A and will not be addressed further. The other
reason will be addressed.

ii.
KIRBY WAS SUBSTANTWELY AGGRIEVED

The stated policy of the Veterinary Practice Act, Idaho Code§ 54-2101 et seq., is public
protection. Idaho Code§ 54-2101 states:
This chapter is enacted as an exercise of the power of the state to promote the public
health, safety and welfare by safeguarding the people and animals of this state by
establishing and enforcing professional standards in the licensure and regulation of
APPELLANTS' BRIEF-Page 15

veterinary health professionals.
When matters outside of the pleadings are consider by the Court in a Rule 12 motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the motion is treated as a summary judgment and the facts are
viewed most favorable to the non-moving party. Paslay v. A&B Irrigation District, 162 Idaho
866, 869, (2017). The allegations of the First Amended Complaint set out ethical violations and
deliberate malpractice by a veterinary physician impinging upon the veterinarian/client/patient
relationship. Does the impingement of those rights assured to Kirby by the Veterinarian Practices
Act and the refusal to address those rights through a contested case aggrieve Kirby?
The entire purpose of an order is to determine the rights, interests and responsibilities "of
one (1) or more specific persons." Idaho Code§ 67-5201(12). The findings of the Letter most
certainly adjudicated all of Kirby's interests as described in Idaho Code§ 67-5201(12) by finding
he had no legal rights, privileges or other legal interests concerning Dr. Collins malpractice and
ethical violations. Most certainly he is aggrieved.
The district court relies upon the absence of a claim for money or, alternatively, a replevin
or claim and delivery request for tangible property to conclude the Letter did not aggrieve Kirby.
This expectation is misguided. Agencies do not issue money judgments or writs of attachments.
Most usually, agencies concern themselves with the determination of intangible rights, e.g.,
licensure, right to highway access, tax status, etc. For instance, a determination to dissolve a
highway board is appealable. Sandpoint lndep. Highway Dist. v. Bd of County Comm'rs, 138
Idaho 887 (2003).
To allow one to litigate her "legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests" before an agency and lose, then tell her she was not an aggrieved party, would be the
silliest non sequitur. Looked at another way, if the license of Dr. Collins had been suspended
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because she impinged upon the health, safety and welfare of Kirby and his animals, surely she
would be able to appeal even though it is not a money judgement and her only loss was that of a
privilege, not a property right. Kirby suffered the reciprocal loss.

iii.
KIRBY WAS PROCEDURALLY AGGRIEVED

The IAP A provides discrete procedural rights, giving rise to a scope of appeal for final
actions "made upon unlawful procedure." Idaho Code§ 67-5779. As explained in State v. Kalani-

Keegan, 155 Idaho 297 (2013), these become substantive rights. The Court pointed out:
Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in a land-use decision
have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. Governing
boards owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their interested
opponents. Both should expect proceedings that are free from procedural defects
that might reasonably have affected the final outcome. See Noble v. Kootenai
Cnty., 148 Idaho 937, 942-43, 231 P.3d 1034, 1039-40 (2010) (holding that, even
though the county board disallowed the public from participating in a site visit,
doing so did not likely affect the decision); Eacret v. Bonner Cnty., 139 Idaho 780,
787, 86 P.3d 494, 501 (2004) (vacating a county board's decision due to a
commissioner's likely bias). This includes the right for all interested parties to have
a meaningful opportunity to present evidence to the governing board on salient
factual issues. Cnty. Residents Against Pollution from Septage Sludge v. Bonner
Cnty., 138 Idaho 585, 588-89, 67 P.3d 64, 67-68 (2003): Sanders Orchard v. Gem
Cnty. ex rel. Bd. ofCntv. Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 702, 52 P.3d 840, 847 (2002).
These cases align with the overarching due-process principle that everyone with a
statutory interest in the outcome ofa decision is entitled to meaningful notice and
a fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. Eacret, 139 Idaho at 787, 86
P.3d 314; see also Eddins v. City ofLewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36,244 P.3d 174, 180
(2010) ("[D]ue process rights are substantial rights."). Accordingly, the Legislature
has provided that people who are affected by land-use proceedings for the most part
have a statutory right to notice and for a chance to participate in a hearing. E.g. LC.
§ 67-6512(d)(2) (requiring public notice and hearing for special-use permits); id. .§
67-6515 (planned-unit developments); id.§ 67-6516(variances).

Of course, assuming that a decision is procedurally fair, applicants for a permit
also have a substantial right in having the governing board properly adjudicate
their applications by applying correct legal standards. Lane Ranch P'ship v. City
o(Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007}: cf. Sagewillow, Inc. v.
Idaho Dep't o(Water Res.. 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 669, 680 (2003) (remanding
because the agency misstated the relevant legal standard and denied an application
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to transfer water rights). Landowner applicants, however, also have a substantial
right to develop their own property. Terrazas v. Blaine Cnty. ex rel. Bd ofComm'rs,
147 Idaho 193,198,207 P.3d 169, 174 (2009).
Id quoting Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd of Comm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228, 232-33,
254 P.3d at 1228-29 (2011) [Emphasis added.]
The Liaison Officer's claim of having conducted an investigation gives substance to the
claim of being personally aggrieved. Did she conduct an investigation? Was it fairly done?
Without his procedural rights guaranteed by statute, Kirby and any reviewing Court remains
forever aggrieved to know whether the claim of having conducted an investigation is true and just,
or instead, arbitrary and capricious.
VII.

ATTORNEY FEES
Kirby is seeking an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rules 35(a)(5), 40 and 4l(a), and Idaho Code§ 12-117. Idaho Appellate Rule 40 allows an award
of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party as a matter of course. I.A.P. 40. However, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that " [c]osts are allowed against the state only where provided by
statute, either expressly or by necessary implication." State v. Gibson, 146 Idaho 420, (2018) citing ·
State v. Thompson, 119 Idaho 67, 70, 803 P.2d 973, 976 (1989) (quoting Chastain's Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 72 Idaho 344,350,241 P.2d 167, 170 (1952)). The statute that allows costs to be
imposed against the state is Idaho Code § 12-117, which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as adverse
parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the state agency,
political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law.
LC.§ 12-117

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - Page 18

The state agency has acted without a reasonable basis based on the black letter law in
Laughyv. Idaho Trans. Dept., 139 Idaho 107 (2003). Both the majority and the dissenting opinions

in Laughy show that the agency's actions in this case is a final agency action and thus appealable;
and therefore, the contention that final agency action is not appealable is unreasonable.

VIII.
CONCLUSION
The dismissive attitude of the Board, the district court and the opposing Attorney General's
office in processing this matter below causes the conclusion that the collective perception of this
case is that this case amounts to a lot of fuss about a couple of mere cats. That is one perception,
but two others may be more significant.
First, Kirby, like many and hopefully most pet owners in Idaho, cherishes the animals for
which he has taken responsibility, honors his responsibilities, and places his hope in the stated
purpose of the Veterinary Practice Act that the these "mere cats" would enjoy the protection of
the public health, safety and welfare by the Board safeguarding the people and animals of this
state.

Through the events and circumstances of the proceedings below, Kirby perceives a

veterinarian cheated him and his animals of this promise, the Board abetted the needless harm, and
the district court drove home the injury by approval of a secret proceeding that allowed no input,
no transparency, and no satisfactory closure. Which leads to the most important aspect of this
appeal.
It may well be that the Board suffers regulatory or agency capture. The symptoms are all
present. Agency capture describes a not uncommon phenomenon in American governments at all
levels in which the industry an agency regulates "captures" the regulatory agency such that the
agency advocates for the industry rather than regulate the industry. Exclusion of public input
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through secret proceedings protects and assures the success and continuation of agency capture.
The proper application of the IAPA provides the primary bulwark against successful agency
capture by assuring public input, transparency, reasoned decisions including written findings of
fact, and a record the courts can review. For instance, in this case, did Dr. Collins commit
malpractice and egregious ethical violations as alleged? Nothing in the record before the Court
contradicts the allegations of Kirby's complaint except an unexplained and gratuitous conclusion
by a Liaison Officer not authorized to substitute her judgment for that of the Board. Absent a
reversal by this Court, the agency has protected the industry from discovery of the answer to this
question. In fact, absent a reversal in accord with Laughy, the stigma of agency capture will loom
unresolved, the allegations against Dr. Collins remain undetermined, and the promise of the Idaho
Veterinary Practice Act to Kirby and his animals remains unfulfilled.
The Court is respectfully requested to remand this matter to the Board with instructions to
conduct a hearing in accordance with IAPA.
DATED this _b_ day of December 2019.
ARKOOSH LAW OFFICES

~C. Tom Arkoosh
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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